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Abstract 
 
This paper is an extension of the debate on the nexus between the strength of IPRs and 
prospects for knowledge economy. It assesses the relationships between software piracy and 
scientific publications in African countries for which data is available. The findings which 
reveal a positive nexus are broadly consistent with the school of thought postulating that, the 
East Asian miracle has been largely due to weaker IPRs regimes at the early stages of 
development. As a policy implication, less stringent IPRs regimes on scientific-related 
software (at least in the short-run) will substantially boost contributions to and dissemination 
of knowledge through scientific and technical publications in Africa. IPRs laws (treaties) on 
scientific-oriented software should be strengthened in tandem with progress in: scientific and 
technical publications and; knowledge spillovers essential for economic growth and 
development. More policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 Over the past decades, there has been a wide consensus on the crucial role that 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection play on the promotion of innovation processes, 
economic growth and development. Recent advancements in information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) have not only resulted in an increased availability of information and 
technology related products but also in the proliferation of technology used to copy and/or 
pirate such commodities. Accordingly, efforts are being placed on increasing and harmonizing 
the standards and enforcements of IPRs protection at the global level. Since the issue of IPRs 
consolidation and curtailment of the proliferation of pirated goods is more pronounced in 
developing countries, the concern over the effects of these efforts on development has been 
widely debated.  
 While some scholars have postulated that, increased protection of IPRs stimulate 
economic growth and development through the positive impact on factor productivity (Falvey 
et al., 2006; Gould & Gruben, 1996), some skeptics are of the stance that IPRs protection and 
adherence to international treaties (laws) may stifle, rather than stimulate economic growth in 
developing countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001). Proponents of less stringent IPRs argue that, 
because the existing technology in developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in 
nature (rather than suitable for the creation of new innovations), developing countries will be 
detrimentally affected by tight IPRs law regimes. Moreover, it is vehemently disputed that, 
weaker IPRs are necessary (at least on a temporal basis) for developing countries to obtain 
knowledge spillovers essential for growth and development. These skeptical positions have 
gained prominence in the debate over if ‘permission’ should be granted to enable the 
‘copying’ of life-saving pharmaceuticals, especially those used in the management of 
HIV/AIDS in developing countries most affected and least likely to afford such treatments.  
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 In light of the above, there is increasing relevance on the incidence of IPRs protection 
on technological advancement, promotion of innovation and economic development. While 
theoretical literature has addressed the concern to some extent, scanty scholarly focus has 
been devoted to empirical literature. A substantial bulk of empirical studies has examined the 
socio-economic determinants of piracy in several copyright industries (Andrés, 2006ab; 
Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 
2009). On the contrary, very few empirical studies have investigated the impact of software 
piracy on economic prosperity (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Andrés & Goel, 2012) and 
knowledge economy (KE).  
 The phenomenon of KE has been increasingly emphasized in with the growing 
relevance of IPRs. Since the 1990s, KE has been central in the reports of most organizations 
(inter alia, OECD, the World Bank), with strong emphasis on the capital role that knowledge 
(created through technological progress and innovation) is the wheel to long-run economic 
growth (World Bank, 2007; Weber, 2001). The interesting literature is consistently of the 
view that, Europe and North America have mastered the dynamics of IPRs in KE and are 
inexorably steering developments at the global and international arenas. Other regions like 
East Asia and Latin America are responding in calculated steps that underscore the imperative 
dimensions of KE and IPRs in their current quests of national, regional and international 
initiatives. Accordingly, the pattern of Japan has set the course for governments of the Newly 
Industrialized Asian Economies (China, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Taiwan) which are playing a crucial role in the progress toward ‘knowledge-based’ 
economies from the ‘product-based’ economies (Chandra & Yokoyama, 2011). In Africa, 
IPRs and KE issues are also assuming central stage in discussions on development.  
 As far as we have reviewed, we currently know very little from the literature on KE 
and IPRs dynamics in Africa. The few studies that have assessed the phenomenon and 
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corresponding nexuses have been limited to economic growth for the most part (Chavula, 
2010). While the growth-KE nexus is important, the debate has recently been centered on how 
African countries can replicate the ‘East Asian Miracle’. As a matter of facts, it has become 
abundantly clear that, for African countries to be involved in the global economy, they must 
be competitive. Competition derives from KE and intellectual capital which are protected by 
IPRs laws and have very recently been the focus of renewed interest in the Africa: either 
through the fight against software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab; Asongu, 2012ab), via 
dynamics in KE-finance nexuses (Asongu, 2012c; Asongu, 2013a), production value of 
doctoral dissertations (Amavilah, 2009) or pro-poor nexuses (Asongu, 2013b).  
With this interesting background, the present paper complements the above literature 
that has epitomized concerns of policy makers in four main words: KE, IPRs, piracy and 
governance. It principally extends the debate on the nexus between the strength of IPRs and 
prospects for knowledge economy by assessing the relationship between software piracy and 
scientific publications in African countries for which data is available. Specifically, the 
study’s contribution to existing literature is fourfold. Firstly, recent evidence has robustly 
established the pro-poor character of software piracy in Africa (Asongu, 2013b). Hence, 
extending the socio-economic flavor of the findings to a KE dimension could be of interesting 
policy relevance. Secondly, a considerable bulk of research on KE has focused on developed 
and the emerging economies of Latin America and East Asia (Dahlan, 2007; Chandra & 
Yokoyama, 2011). Hence, the scanty evidence of the phenomenon in African countries is a 
missing strand also motivating this paper. Thirdly, the role of governance in determining 
trajectories of KE has been crucial in the ‘East Asian miracle’ because; knowledge creation 
and diffusion processes depend on appropriate governance policies that are themselves the 
fruits of government quality. Hence, it would be interesting to assess how formal institutions 
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are instrumental in the nexuses we are investigating
2
. Fourthly, the study’s positioning 
substantially steers clear of earlier (AfDB, 2007; Bizri, 2009; Aubert, 2005; Britz et al., 
2006)
3
 and recent
4
 African KE literature in order to provide the much needed policy 
implications (Britz et al., 2006; Makinda, 2007; Lightfoot, 2011)
5
.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Data and methodology issues are 
discussed in Section 2. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology  
 
We assess a panel of 10 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitations to the time 
span and number of countries are constrained by software piracy data availability. The 
corresponding sampled countries are presented in Panel B of Appendix 1.  
 
2.1 Data  
 
The dependent variable is the number of scientific and technical journals published on 
a yearly basis. The independent variable is the software piracy rate, which is defined as “the 
unauthorized copying of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for 
                                                 
2
 Fresh African literature has substantially documented institutional issues on the course to achieving KE in 
(Asongu, 2013a), especially by means of financial sector development (Asongu, 2012d) or transfer of technology 
through development assistance (Asongu, 2012e). 
3
For example, consistent with Asongu (2013a),  the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2007) has assessed the 
impact of public expenditure on the education dimension of KE and found the following: (1) in the short-term, 
there is a positive relationship between public expenditure on education  and economic growth in Africa, as well 
as on knowledge generation and human capital development, which have a potential to positively affect 
aggregate labor productivity; (2) in the long-term however, public expenditure is negatively related to economic 
growth due to the often lack of capacity to retrain human capital and subsequent brain drain. 
4
 See discussion in the preceding paragraph.  
5
Britz et al. (2006) have examined the question of whether Africa is moving towards a KE and found that, Africa 
still has a far way to go down the road and the journey could be quickened with certain preconditions, amongst 
others: investment in human capital, effective stopping of brain drain, as well as effective development and 
maintenance of a physical infrastructure. In accordance with  Makinda, in order to rectify the gap between SSA 
and the Western World, African policy makers need to: (1) define the type of knowledge their countries require; 
(2) establish conditions for nurturing strategic leaders who will in turn, seek right forms of knowledge to tackle 
Africa’s problems; (3) build political and legal frameworks that encourage the absorption and application of 
scientific innovation and; (4) revamp universities, establish regional research centers and take capacity building 
more seriously (Makinda, 2007). This need for policy reforms draws from the Lightfoot (2011) conclusion that 
emphasizes the need for in-depth reforms as means to fulfilling the policy aspirations rather than speculating 
over progress through technology enriched futures.  
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either commercial or personal use” (SIIA, 2000). Software piracy may potentially take many 
avenues (e.g., organized copiers, piracy by individuals and commercial or business piracy), 
thus obtaining an accurate measure of the prevalence of software piracy remains a challenge 
in the literature. There are many types of software piracy. According to the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA), we can distinguish among: 1) downloading; 2) end user copying; and 3) 
counterfeiting. The level of software piracy is computed as the difference in demand for new 
software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software. In the 
present paper, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software (primarily 
business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) on an annual basis 
and is taken to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is presented in percentages, 
scaling from 0 % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is of pirated origin). Piracy 
rates source from the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2010). More information on 
measurement could be obtained from the BSA (2009)
6
. Though the BSA is an industry group, 
its data on software piracy is the best cross-country measure currently used in the literature.  
The good governance instrumental variables from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are 
consistent with recent IPRs (Asongu, 2012b) and piracy (2013b) literature. As stated in the 
introduction, the role of governance has been crucial for the ‘East Asian miracle’. This is 
essentially because; knowledge creation and diffusion processes depend on appropriate 
governance policies that are themselves the fruits of government quality. Indeed, the role of 
governance is straight forward; the institutional framework is crucial for gaining adequate 
flow of knowledge between scientific research and technological applications, as well as for a 
good information flow between knowledge users and researchers. Therefore, governments 
play a critical mission, because the creation of knowledge cannot be left to imperfect market 
                                                 
6
 Data from the BSA primarily measures the piracy of commercial software.  See Png (2008) and Traphagan & 
Griffith (1998) for a discussion on the reliability of piracy data. This data has been widely used in the piracy 
literature (Marron & Steel, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 2006ab; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Asongu, 2012ab, 
2013b; Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab). 
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mechanisms. The government quality instrumental variable can be grouped into three 
concepts. The first concerns the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced 
[Political Governance]: voice & accountability and political stability. The second is the 
capacity of government to formulate & implement policies and deliver services [Economic 
Governance]: regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no means the 
least, concerns the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions 
among them [Institutional Governance]: rule of law and control of corruption.  
We control for the literacy rate (secondary education and tertiary enrollment), ICTs 
(internet penetration and number of personal computer (PC) users) and innovation (foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and FDI inflows). We cannot control for more than three factors at 
the same time owing to: (1) constraints in the “Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR)” test for 
instrument validity
7
 and; (2) concerns of overparametization and multicolinearity. Hence, we 
employ two specifications that contain one variable in the indentified categories above. 
Intuitively, we expect all the control variables to positively affect scientific publications. This 
is essentially because from common sense, increased literacy, ICTs and innovation should 
create a conducive climate for scientific and technical related activities that ultimately lead to 
publications of corresponding results in journals.  
The summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (showing 
the nexuses among key variables used in the paper), and variable definitions (with 
corresponding sources) are presented in the appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ (Appendix 
1) of the variables used in the estimations shows that, there is quite some variation in the data 
used so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses should emerge. The 
objective of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to mitigate concerns of overparametization 
                                                 
7
An OIR test is only applicable in the presence of over-identification, that is, the instruments must be higher than 
the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact- identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition impossible.  
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and multicolinearity. Based on an initial assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do 
not appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  
Definitions and corresponding sources of the variables are presented in Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Endogeneity  
 The issue of endogeneity has two main justifications. Firstly, whereas scientific 
publications could be influenced by the degree of software piracy, the reverse effect cannot be 
ruled-out because as an economy grows in scientific knowledge, it tends to have better IPRs 
laws (on software piracy) hence, the concern of reverse-causality. Secondly, in the empirical 
IPRs literature, Bezmen & Depken (2004) have insisted that studies investigating the IPRs-
development nexus are subject to potential endogeneity problems, because it is likely that a 
nation’s level of development is a crucial factor in the choice of, or adherence to, a particular 
IPRs regime. This justifies an earlier position by Ginarte & Park (1997) which states that, the 
height of economic development explains the strength of patent protection provided by 
individual countries. Before addressing this endogeneity concern, we shall briefly examine its 
presence with the Hausman test and then employ an estimation technique compatible with the 
outcome of the test.  
 
2.2.2 Estimation technique  
 A two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) estimation approach is 
adopted for two main reasons. Firstly, it is compatible with the problem statement that seeks 
to assess the instrumentality of governance tools in KE building (by means of scientific 
publications) through software piracy. Secondly, it deals effectively with the endogeneity 
concern thus, avoiding the inconsistency of estimates by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) which 
arise when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term.  
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The 2SLS estimation will entail the following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
 itiit sInstrumentPiracy )(10  iti X2 itv                          (1)                           
 
Second-stage regression: 
 
 itiit PiracySP )(10  iti X2   itu                   (2) 
 
In Eqs. (1) and (2), Piracy represents the software piracy rate. The instruments are 
government quality dynamics of: the rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability, 
government effectiveness, political stability/no violence and corruption-control. i1  are the 
estimated effects on Piracy of the instruments (described above in the data section).  SP 
denotes scientific and technical publications and, i1  are estimated impacts of Piracy on 
publications.  X is a set of control variables (described above and defined in Appendix 3) and, 
i2  ( i2 ) are their corresponding effects on Piracy (publications) of the control variables. In 
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) respectively, v and u represent the error terms.  
Consistent with recent IPRs and software piracy literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a), 
we adopt the following steps in the estimation procedure: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over 
an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variable (piracy 
channel) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the 
main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.  Further robustness checks are 
ensured with: (1) modeling with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
standard errors; (2) employment of restricted and unrestricted regressions and; (3) the use of 
an alternative set of control variables.  
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3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1 Presentation of results 
 
This section aims to examine two main issues:  (1) the capacity of the exogenous 
components of the piracy channel to explain scientific publications and; (2) the ability of the 
instruments to explain publications beyond the piracy channel. Whereas the first issue is 
addressed by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, the second is solved with 
the Sargan-OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, the instruments 
explain publications only through the piracy mechanism, conditional on other covariates 
(control variables). Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the 
instruments do not explain publications beyond the piracy channel. A Hausman test is 
performed prior to the 2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, 
estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Therefore, a rejection of this null 
hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and thus, lends 
credit to the choice of the IV estimation technique. 
Table 1 below summarizes the findings. Panel A (B) entail the first (second) 
specification with a different set of control variables. For either panel, the first (second) 
halves are restricted (unrestricted) 2SLS with HAC standard errors. While the Hauman for 
endogeneity is overwhelmingly significant in Panel A, it is not for Panel B. As concerns the 
first issue, a positive piracy-publications nexus is overwhelmingly consistent across 
specifications and panels. For the second issue, the Sargan OIR is increasingly insignificant as 
the number of control variables increase. This implies, when the control variables are few, 
government quality instrumental variables explain publications beyond the piracy mechanism. 
However, when the degrees of freedom necessary for the OIR test are two (that is, six 
instruments and four explaining variables), the null hypothesis is rejected consistently across 
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the unrestricted specifications of both panels. This means the instruments are valid and not 
correlated with the error term in the equation of interest (Eq. 2).  
Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. Firstly, ICTs by 
means of internet penetration and proliferation in the number of PC users create favorable 
conditions for scientific publications. Secondly, innovation in terms of FDI increases 
knowledge spillovers as attempts by scientific bodies are made to explain, replicated 
and/imitate the imported know-how (technology). Thirdly, the negative nexus between 
tertiary education and publication has a fivefold justification: (1) the low rate of tertiary 
students pursuing education to research levels due to socio-economic and political reasons; 
(2) the absence of substantial government incentives for research purposes; (3) the 
disincentive to research because academic appointments are politically motivated (and not 
based on peer assessments), (4) academic brain drain  and; (5) the culture of academic 
promotion based on teaching and oral examinations
8
. 
 
Table 3: Restricted and Unrestricted 2SLS  
         
 Dependent variable: Scientific and Technical Journals Publications  
         
 Panel A: First Specification  
 Restricted HAC SE 2SLS  Unrestricted HAC SE 2SLS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model 4* 
Constant  --- --- --- --- 2.462*** 0.630 -0.332 -4.337*** 
     (0.000) (0.538) (0.467) (0.000) 
Piracy  3.722*** 1.319** -0.023 -0.836** -0.601 0.867 0.180 0.441** 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.958) (0.034) (0.568) (0.480) (0.638) (0.034) 
Tertiary Edu --- 1.548*** -0.680 -1.151*** --- 1.147*** -0.526 -0.877** 
  (0.000) (0.156) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.243) (0.023) 
Internet  --- --- 1.044*** 0.619*** --- --- 1.071*** 1.185*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI --- --- --- 0.074 --- --- --- 0.154*** 
    (0.202)    (0.007) 
         
Hausman 5.842** 14.407*** 27.624*** 8.698* 0.060 4.698* 28.417*** 185.67*** 
         
Sargan OIR 44.721*** 27.168*** 13.818*** 24.176*** 44.866*** 30.325*** 13.010*** 0.595 
 (0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.742) 
Adjusted R² 0.042 0.032 0.605 0.399 0.023 0.009 0.605 0.534 
Fisher  --- --- 238.27*** 202.47*** --- 5.451*** 12.888*** 14.256*** 
Chi² --- 269.35*** --- --- 0.324 --- --- --- 
Observations 53 42 42 40 53 42 42 40 
         
                                                 
8
 For example, university lecturers with an extensive teaching experience are more likely to pass the oral 
examination for promotion in CAMES (African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education).  
13 
 
 Panel B: Second Specification 
 Restricted HAC SE 2SLS  Unrestricted HAC SE 2SLS 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 5* Model 6* Model 7* Model 8* 
Constant  --- --- --- --- 2.462*** 3.860*** -5.743*** -9.870 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.165) 
Piracy  3.722*** 0.582 0.199 0.335 -0.601 -0.607 1.778*** 2.453** 
 (0.000) (0.383) (0.662) (0.513) (0.568) (0.551) (0.009) (0.044) 
Secondary Edu  --- 1.057*** -0.749 -0.567 --- -0.872 1.225* 2.026 
  (0.000) (0.208) (0.332)  (0.163) (0.078) (0.229) 
PC Users --- --- 1.341*** 1.231*** --- --- 2.006*** 2.858** 
   (0.001) (0.002)   (0.000) (0.045) 
FDI inflows --- --- --- -0.048 --- --- --- 0.163 
    (0.289)    (0.498) 
         
Hausman 5.842** 4.601 4.645 4.073 0.060 1.000 15.849*** 27.534*** 
         
Sargan OIR 44.721*** 33.195*** 30.624*** 32.176*** 44.866*** 33.752*** 15.593*** 4.444 
 (0.000) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.108) 
Adjusted R² 0.042 -0.013 0.505 0.527 0.023 -0.036 0.487 0.252 
Fisher --- --- 170.33*** 183.02*** --- 0.972 18.772*** 6.060*** 
Chi² --- 364.42*** --- --- 0.324 --- --- --- 
Observations 53 44 44 44 53 44 44 44 
         
Instruments  Constant; Corruption-Control; Voice & Accountability; Regulation Quality; Rule of Law; Political Stability; 
Government Effectiveness.  
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ( ): p-values.  2SLS: Two-Stage-Least Squares. HAC: 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. SE: Standard Errors. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test.  
 
 
3. 2 Discussion of results, policy implications and caveats 
 
3.2.1 Discussion and policy implications 
 
 Our findings have broadly demonstrated that, software piracy is pro-scientific 
publications, which further indicate that good governance is not a sufficient condition for a 
negative piracy-publications nexus. Hence, it could be inferred that, formal institutions are 
instrumental in the friendly character of software piracy on scientific publications. 
Accordingly, this evidence is fairly logical because it is hard to reconcile the substantially 
high cost of software (related to scientific activity) with the low income of researchers in most 
African countries. From a global perspective, our results reflect the Chinese model of KE. 
Accordingly, though there has been a clear positive nexus between good governance and the 
upholding of IPRs imperative for KE in much of East Asia, China has largely remained an 
exception to this rule. China’s success story in attracting FDI is attributed to its spectacular 
growth track record, relatively better executive power, good infrastructure, abundant educated 
labor force and, a large domestic market (Chandra & Yokoyama, 2011, p. 46). For now the 
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empirical evidence seems to indicate that African countries are in the same paradigm as China 
with respect to the impact of good governance measures on the piracy-publications nexus.  
 The results are also generally consistent with the Chinese model insofar as they are in 
line with studies on wealth-effects that have established the existence of a non-linear nexus 
between income-levels and IPRs (Kim, 2004; Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). These studies have 
documented that, patent protection tends to ameliorate as economies move from low- to 
middle-income platforms and that, this protection decreases with the ability to imitate new 
technologies. The kernel of the intuition here is that, IPRs are thought to be successful at 
spurring economic prosperity only after a nation has acquired sufficient human capital and 
technology infrastructure for creative imitation to occur. Hence, it could be inferred that, 
strong IPRs protection in the early stage of African industrialization (when knowledge and 
technology can be acquired via reverse engineering, duplication and/or imitation) could 
substantially hamper knowledge contribution and spillovers in sampled countries.  
Looking at one of the ongoing debates that have partially motivated this paper, it has 
been well documented that, the ‘East Asian miracle’ has substantially been due to less tight 
IPRs at the early stages of economic development in the region. This documentation has 
supported the thesis that, the changing strength of IPRs regimes depends on the nation’s level 
of development and/or current technological capacity. Further evidence has suggested that, 
this miracle has been largely due to this nation’s ability to absorb, replicate and duplicate 
foreign innovations through some form of piracy. However, it has also been established that, 
as these countries became significant producers of new technologies and innovations, their 
IPRs regimes were tightened (Nelson & Pack, 1999). Hence, our findings are broadly 
consistent with the Nelson & Pack postulation that, as the assimilation of existing techniques 
and technologies was a critical component in the success of these Asian countries, their 
sampled African counterparts would have to give less significance to the Maskus (2000) 
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caution. Accordingly, Maskus has postulated that, weaker IPRs might not necessarily be 
beneficial to developing countries as it may cause them to become dependent on older and 
less efficient technologies.  
Another line of interpretation is the manner in which the findings reconcile the debate. 
Accordingly, based on the results, it could be established that less tight IPRs regimes on 
‘scientific publication’-related software (at least in the short-run) would enable knowledge 
spillovers imperative for growth and development. However, as the sampled countries grow, 
adoption of tighter IPRs regimes will facilitate inflows of innovation and technology transfers 
(Lee & Mansfield, 1996), stimulate exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and, increase the 
likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 
1996). 
It will also be interesting to provide a ‘down-to-earth’ elucidation of the positive 
piracy-publication nexus. Given the relatively high cost of scientific-related software, many 
African scholars cannot afford to buy original software packages. Therefore illegal copying, 
unauthorized downloading and counterfeiting become the only options of obtaining the 
desired software package. By purchasing cheap pirated software, scholars can save money for 
other research utilities. Hence, this indirectly increases their exposure to research facilities 
that eventually lead to more publications. This interpretation is in accordance with the 
hypothesis that, the poor are more prone to using pirated software (Moores & Esichaikul, 
2011, 1-2). Moores & Esichaikul have found a strong negative nexus between economic 
wealth and the level of software piracy, such that poorer countries tend to have higher levels 
of software piracy.  
Apart from economic considerations, another factor that could explain the nexus 
established in the findings is African culture. Moores & Esichaikul (2011, 2) have also found 
that, countries with a more collectivist society also tend to have higher levels of software 
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piracy. Hence, the sharing culture in African academic institutions could also be a major 
factor for the positive relationship. This interpretation is consistent with a great bulk of the 
literature that has examined the determinants of the willingness to pirate software (by 
assessing the socio-economic factors that affect piracy). The conclusion drawn from these 
studies is that, countries with higher income and greater individualism have lower piracy rates 
(Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Thompson, 1996, 1999; Park & Ginarte, 
1997; Rushing & Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenberg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 
2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004).  
Examining the findings in light of very recent African IPRs literature is also essential. 
Asongu (2013b) has found software piracy to be pro-poor using almost the same sample. His 
conclusion is broadly consistent with the discussion in the preceding paragraph. This strand of 
discussion is also in accordance with Andrés & Asongu (2012) who have shown that, from 
the education dimension of KE, adoption of tight IPRs regimes may negatively affect human 
development by diminishing the literacy rate and restricting diffusion of knowledge. 
However, Andrés & Asongu have also documented that, adherence to international IPRs 
protection treaties (laws) may not impede per capita economic prosperity and could improve 
life-expectancy.  
The major policy implication of this study is that, imposing very tight laws against 
software piracy by government institutions is not a sufficient condition for KE in the sampled 
countries. Hence, the Chinese model may be a better reflection of what is happening in this 
group of countries. Four main ethical implications are also worth noting:  (1) the seller of 
pirated software thinks (S)he is right to continue her (his) business because the company may 
incur more expenses taking the matter to court; (2) users of pirated software think it is right to 
use pirated commodities because they are poor; (3) illegal copying might be based on 
interpersonal trust as those who either copy or share software with others must trust that the 
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software contains no viruses and; (4) moreover, individuals distributing illegal copies to 
others must trust these persons not to report to the police. 
 
3.2.2 Caveats   
 
Two main caveats have been retained: shortcomings in the measurement of software 
piracy and, the perception based good governance measures that may be subject to substantial 
bias owing to media propaganda.  
Firstly, consistent with Asongu (2012b), on the measurement of software piracy, three 
points are relevant. Firstly, the ‘piracy level is computed as the difference in demand for new 
software applications (computed from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software’. It is 
important to emphasize that, this metric defines piracy as the drop in demand of software 
products. Therefore, all pirated copies constitute lost sales. Secondly, it has also been 
substantially documented that, those who buy pirated copies do not always have the money to 
buy the true commodity. Therefore to consider the use of pirated products as diminishing 
demand for originals could be some kind of overstatement. Thirdly, the employment of the 
metric presupposes knowledge of the elasticity of demand for the original product. Otherwise, 
there will be a comparison of pirated commodities that constitute loss in sales with ones that 
do not. Thus, there is some upward bias in the software piracy estimate.  
Government quality indicators are perception based measures that may be subject to a 
considerable degree of media propaganda. Nonetheless, as far as we have reviewed, there are 
no better government quality indicators than those available in the World Bank Development 
Indicators.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has extended the debate on the nexus between the strength of IPRs and 
prospects for knowledge economy. It has assessed the relationships between software piracy 
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and scientific publications in African countries for which data is available. The findings 
which reveal a positive nexus are broadly consistent with the school of thought postulating 
that, the East Asian miracle has been largely due to weaker IPRs regimes at the early stages of 
development. As a policy implication, less stringent IPRs regimes on scientific-related 
software (at least in the short-run) will substantially boost contributions to and dissemination 
of knowledge through scientific and technical publications in Africa. IPRs laws (treaties) on 
scientific-oriented software should be strengthened in tandem with progress in: scientific and 
technical publications and; knowledge spillovers essential for economic growth and 
development. More policy implications have been discussed.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
Dependent Variable Scientific & Technical Journals Articles  2.159 0.583 1.120 3.286 80 
       
Independent Variable Piracy rate 0.485 0.222 0.034 0.720 95 
       
 
 
Control Variables  
Tertiary School Enrollment (TSE) 0.992 0.304 0.380 1.486 67 
Secondary School Enrollment (SSE) 1.656 0.219 1.201 1.948 74 
Internet Penetration  2.822 0.809 1.301 4.727 110 
Personal Computer Users  2.535 0.448 1.699 3.553 110 
Foreign Direct Investment  2.626 2.893 -7.646 11.603 99 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 2.642 2.372 -0.610 11.603 110 
       
 
 
Good Governance 
Instrumental Variables  
Rule of Law -0.342 0.709 -1.657 1.053 100 
Regulation Quality -0.250 0.524 -1.305 0.905 100 
Government Effectiveness  -0.252 0.546 -1.038 0.801 90 
Voice & Accountability  -0.371 0.659 -1.256 1.047 100 
Corruption-Control -0.371 0.638 -1.236 1.086 100 
Political Stability (No Violence)  -0.432 0.872 -2.094 0.996 100 
       
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia.  
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation analysis  
               
Piracy Control  Variables Government Quality  Instrumental Variables  
S&T  
JA 
 
Education ICT Innovation  
TSE SSE Internet PC FDI FDI I CC GE RL RQ V&A PolS  
1.000 -0.43 -0.44 -0.010 -0.33 0.031 0.018 -0.31 -0.44 -0.55 -0.47 -0.15 -0.26 -0.17 Piracy 
 1.000 0.655 0.484 0.517 0.169 0.296 0.257 0.288 0.385 0.076 -0.04 0.039 0.249 TE 
  1.000 0.078 -0.01 0.001 -0.03 0.542 0.566 0.575 0.593 0.387 0.408 -0.01 SE 
   1.000 0.873 -0.02 0.080 -0.39 -0.28 -0.31 -0.39 -0.50 -0.54 0.696 Internet 
    1.000 -0.07 -0.01 -0.36 -0.19 -0.25 -0.35 -0.52 -0.56 0.807 PC 
     1.000 0.874 0.178 0.116 0.182 0.147 0.142 0.287 -0.05 FDI 
      1.000 0.102 0.065 0.149 0.060 0.079 0.239 -0.08 FDI I 
       1.000 0.951 0.907 0.855 0.773 0.784 -0.39 CC 
        1.000 0.930 0.918 0.795 0.750 -0.34 GE 
         1.000 0.888 0.732 0.824 -0.40 RL 
          1.000 0.815 0.781 -0.48 RQ 
           1.000 0.739 -0.72 V&A 
            1.000 -0.66 PolS 
             1.000 S&T JA 
               
TSE: Tertiary School Enrollment. SSE: Secondary School Enrollment. Internet: Internet Penetration. PC: PC Users. FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment. FDI I: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows. CC: Corruption-Control. GE: Government Effectiveness. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. V&A: Voice & Accountability. PolS: Political Stability. S&T J A: Scientific & Technical Journal Articles.  
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Panel A: Dependent and Independent Variables  
    
Scientific Publications  S&T JA Logarithm  of Scientific and Technical Journal Articles  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Logarithm Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Panel B: Control  Variables  
    
Tertiary Enrollment  TSE Logarithm of Tertiary School Enrollment  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Secondary Enrollment SSE Logarithm of Secondary  School Enrollment World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet Penetration  Internet  Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000 GMID 
    
Personal Computer  Users PC  Logarithm of Personal Computer Users per Capita  GMID 
    
Foreign Direct Investment FDI Net Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
FDI Inflows  FDI I Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Panel C: Good Governance Instrumental Variables  
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL  
Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Regulation Quality  
 
RQ 
Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
Gov. E 
Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Voice & Accountability  
 
V&A 
Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to 
enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Control of Corruption  
 
CC 
Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Political Stability (No 
Violence) 
 
PolSta 
Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured 
as the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  BSA: Business Software Alliance. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. GMID: Global Market 
Information Database.  
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